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ORANGE IS THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION:




Picture, for a moment, two criminal offenders. Suppose that the respective of-
fenders committed the same, exact victimless crime in the same, exact manner. Accept
that they both are guilty, have no valid defenses, and are subsequently convicted.
Perhaps they were arrested for drug possession—possibly marijuana. It could well
be that fraud proved the downfall of these two offenders. Maybe they engaged in
some grand larceny. For present purposes, though, the particular offense is not nearly
as important as the identity of the individuals who committed it.
Imagine, further, that both offenders are the same age—in their mid to late twenties.
Both are currently unmarried, and neither has a history of domestic violence as either
a victim or perpetrator. Both have a high school diploma and have been employed
in low-skilled labor positions for the past several years with dependable regularity.
Both offenders have similar extrinsic support systems. Like most individuals, they
both have a network of loved ones—parents, siblings, cousins, and friends—who
are willing to offer guidance and provide assistance. So far, so good. Right?
Assume, however, like all individuals who find themselves cloaked in the tell-
tale orange of the criminal justice system, that the offenders are imperfect. Each has
a prior juvenile, nonviolent felony conviction, again for an identical crime. Both have
close companions and associates who are also known criminals. Both display certain
antisocial attitudes such as a lack of respect for authority and the law. Both possess
problems with self-control and occasionally exhibit behaviors that are defiant, even
reckless. Both have had problems with drugs and alcohol. Recall that both commit-
ted the same, exact crime in the same, exact manner.
Surely, the two offenders receive the same, exact sentence. Certainly, if the adage
that “justice is blind” holds true, any result to the contrary would be inconceivable.
Given this nation’s guiding principle and promise that everyone shall receive equal
treatment under the law, such a dissimilar outcome would undoubtedly be unconsti-
tutional.1 This, however, is precisely the unimaginable outcome that faces the two crim-
inal offenders: they do not receive the same punishment even though they committed
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1 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. amend. V.
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the same, exact crime. In many states, it is entirely possible that one offender may
serve prison time while the other is diverted from incarceration to undergo an alter-
native penological treatment. One offender has his liberty interests stripped to their
very core, confined behind bars in the six-by-eight-foot prison cell. The other offender
is free to carry on her life in the shared presence of family, friends, and community,
albeit under the watchful eye of a case manager or probation officer.
How is this outcome possible? Simple. The offenders are identical in every re-
spect save one. The criminal offender who is faced with a prison sentence is a man,
and the criminal offender who is diverted from the penitentiary system is a woman.
This hypothetical scenario has almost certainly played out in states that employ actu-
arial sentencing practices that use gender as a factor in determining risk assessment
scores2 incorporated into pre-sentencing reports.
Professor Sonja B. Starr lists the notion that judges “should not follow a policy
of increasing the sentences of male defendants, or reducing those of female defen-
dants, on the explicit basis of gender” among generally accepted sentencing “don’ts.”3
Many jurisdictions, however, are encouraging judges to do just that through regimes
that utilize evidence-based sentencing (EBS).4 Evidence-based sentencing can be
defined as judicial decision-making premised upon empirical research or actuarial
assessment of factors such as age, gender, marital status, criminal history, education,
and employment in order to determine a particular defendant’s recidivism risk.5
According to Judge Roger K. Warren, President Emeritus of the National Center for
State Courts (NCSC), the general objectives driving the use of evidence-based sen-
tencing include “improv[ing] the effectiveness of sentencing outcomes,” “reduc[ing]
reliance on long-term incarceration as a criminal sanction,” and “promot[ing] the
2 See Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING
AND CORRECTIONS 196, 198 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012). Slobogin defines
“risk assessment” as “the identification of ‘risk’ factors and ‘protective’ factors that make
involvement in crime more or less likely.” Id. at 196. He notes that such factors can be either
static or dynamic. Id. Static factors, such as “gender, age, and prior criminal history,” can be
classified as “phenomena that cannot be changed through human intervention.” Id.
3 Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Dis-
crimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 804 (2014).
4 See id. at 805.
5 See, e.g., id. (“‘Evidence,’ in this formulation, refers not to the evidence in the particular
case but to empirical research on factors predicting criminal recidivism.”); Matthew Kleiman,
Using Evidence-Based Practices in Sentencing Criminal Offenders, in 44 THE BOOK OF THE
STATES 299, 299–300 (Council of State Gov’ts ed., 2012), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org
/kc/system/files/matthew_kleiman_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/FER7-76J6] (“Evidence-based
sentencing refers to judges using information about offender risk, needs and responsivity to
inform the most appropriate sentence for a convicted offender.”); Richard E. Redding,
Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Science of Sentencing Policy and Practice, 1 CHAP. J.
CRIM. JUST. 1, 3–4 (2009) (noting that evidence-based sentencing typically includes assess-
ment of risk factors, protective factors, and criminogenic needs, estimation of recidivism
risks, and identification of the most effective sentencing regime).
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development, funding, and utilization of community-based alternatives to incarcera-
tion for appropriate offenders.”6 Although these aspirations may be desirable as a
matter of public policy, the attendant realities result in outcomes contrary to notions of
fairness and justice. As such, the use of gender in evidence-based sentencing sub-
jects the penal system to suspect constructs and is repugnant as a matter of law.
The underlying justification for punishment is the idea that one should answer
for the crimes he or she commits singularly, rather than for the sins of the many. In
the context of gender, the “many” constitutes a variable half of the population. Peno-
logical considerations of gender in sentencing are simply incompatible with abstract
notions that criminal offenders appear before the court in their individual capacities.7
More important, the use of gender in evidence-based sentencing violates the con-
crete promises of equal protection under the law provided by the Constitution.8
Just because a sentencing regime sublimates the use of suspect classifications
into acceptability under the guise of questionable social science, actuarial accuracy,
and economic efficiency does not—or, at the very least, should not—make such uses
any more legitimate in the eyes of the law. Increased reliance on evidence-based prac-
tices that incorporate gender discrimination cloaked in the mathematics of empirical
“truth,” however, does just that.9 Surely, this cannot stand if all individuals are to
enjoy equal treatment in the eyes of the law. Considerations of gender in risk assess-
ment permit Justice to peak beneath her folds just enough to cast a biased glance
against those offenders who happen to possess a Y chromosome.
As of year-end 2013, roughly one in thirty-five adults in America was under the
control of the correctional supervision system.10 Soon, the shared national reality will
6 Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy
Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1307 (2007) (quoting TRACY W. PETERS
& ROGER K. WARREN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GETTING SMARTER ABOUT SEN-
TENCING: NCSC’S SENTENCING REFORM SURVEY 10 (2006), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media
/Microsites/Files/CSI/GettingSmarter_SentencingReformSurvey_FinalPub.ashx [http://perma
.cc/5FHB-U8NC]).
7 See Starr, supra note 3, at 807 (“[I]ndividuals are entitled to be treated as individuals.”).
8 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. amend. V.
9 See Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and
Procedure—And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 866 (2002) (“To the extent that em-
piricism improves the transparency of the system or enables individuals to better hold criminal
justice system actors more accountable, legitimacy of the system may well increase.” (cita-
tion omitted)); see also BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING,
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 3 (2007) (“The perceived success of predictive instru-
ments has made theories of punishment that function more smoothly with prediction seem more
natural. . . . Yet these actuarial instruments represent nothing more than fortuitous advances in
technical knowledge from disciplines . . . that have no normative stake in the criminal law.”).
10 LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 1 (2014), http://www
.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf [http://perma.cc/2RT2-LS5W] (“An estimated 6,899,000
persons were under the supervision of adult correctional systems at yearend 2013 . . . .”).
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be to know someone who is or has been affected by the criminal justice system—not
just those who are incarcerated, but children without parents, mothers without part-
ners, parolees without futures, and past offenders without hope. It is not merely a
men’s issue or a women’s issue. The problem is pervasive, and any system that
contributes to such statistics is patently unjust.11 Regardless of whether courts take
action, the great debate surrounding the national infatuation with mass incarceration
needs to include evidence-based sentencing. The invidious use of gender in evidence-
based sentencing regimes cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny in an equal protec-
tion challenge, because such considerations unduly injure male criminal offenders.
This Note will demonstrate how gender considerations must be excised from
evidence-based sentencing regimes in order to assure their constitutionality under
the Equal Protection components of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.12 Part I
examines the constitutional framework and legal challenges to the use of gender in
criminal sentencing. Part II provides both a brief introduction to the factors that gave
rise to discretionary sentencing and an overview of the history behind evidence-based
sentencing. Part III discusses how the use of gender subverts not only the policy justi-
fications for using evidence-based sentencing generally, but also how such consid-
erations subvert the justifications for overtly gendered sentencing more specifically.
Part IV delves into the empirical data advocating the use of gender in evidence-based
sentencing. The conclusion proposes suggestions for states that use evidence-based
sentencing going forward.
I. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
Gender first emerged as a suspect variable in large part due to challenges brought
against gender-specific classifications that disadvantaged men.13 Other equal pro-
tection violations take the form of non-gender-specific classifications that have a
discriminatory purpose and effect14 and gender-specific classifications that are intended
to benefit women.15 Commonly, this particular area of controversy has gained the
most traction in challenges to gender-specific classifications that disadvantage women.16
11 See infra Part IV for conclusions regarding the use of evidence-based sentencing and
mass incarceration.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. amend. V.
13 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that equal protec-
tion barred the exclusion of male jurors based on gender); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(holding that a statute prohibiting the sale of non-intoxicating beer to males under twenty-one
years old and females under eighteen years old was an equal protection violation).
14 See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (finding that the government
lacked a gender-driven discriminatory purpose in offering veterans preferential treatment).
15 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that a nursing
school’s refusal to admit a male student violated equal protection, absent a history of discrim-
ination against female nurses).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that the university’s
refusal to admit a female student violated equal protection).
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In order to withstand an equal protection challenge, state-sanctioned consider-
ations of gender must survive intermediate scrutiny.17 Under this level of scrutiny,
such classifications “must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”18 Later cases required an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for gender classifications.19 Notably, adminis-
trative ease and convenience are not sufficiently important governmental objectives.20
Moreover, the stated objectives “must describe actual state purposes, not rationaliza-
tions for actions in fact differently grounded.”21 Simply put, the state cannot list any
hypothetical or conceivable purpose if it expects to survive intermediate scrutiny.
Finally, gender-based equal protection precedent has stated on several occasions that
“archaic and overbroad generalizations”22 or “outdated misconceptions”23 about the
genders are also invalid as a matter of justification.24 Often, gender-driven assumptions
are centered on unsupported and old-fashioned notions about the attitudes, behaviors,
and financial positions of men and women.25
17 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197–98.
18 Id.
19 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136–37
(1994); Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724.
20 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (holding that administra-
tive convenience is not sufficiently important to justify an increased burden on women in the
military to obtain dependent benefits for their husbands); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656
(1972) (holding that government efficiency is insufficient to justify dependency proceedings
only for unwed fathers upon a mother’s death); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971)
(finding that Idaho’s statutory preference for men as estate administrators was unconstitu-
tional, as it was done to eliminate hearings on the merits).
21 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535–36.
22 See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (upholding the U.S. Navy’s
promotion rule because it was not based on archaic and overbroad generalizations).
23 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 198–99.
24 See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (noting that disparate
treatment between the genders “very likely reflect[s] outmoded notions of the relative capa-
bilities of men and women”).
25 For an overview of what constitutes an archaic and overbroad generalization or outdated
misconception, compare J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994) (conclud-
ing that gender alone predicted juror attitudes in a paternity and child support hearing was unsup-
ported), Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282–83 (1979) (finding that alimony obligations for men, but
not women, propagated outdated stereotypes), Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210–11
(1977) (finding a provision differentiating between the financial needs of widows and widowers
was overbroad and archaic), Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975) (finding that gender
differences in child support obligations were based on outdated misconceptions), Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (finding the assumption that males’ earnings were more
vital than females’ earnings to support families was overbroad and archaic), Frontiero, 411 U.S.
at 690 (finding the assumption that male spouses of servicewomen would not be financially
dependent on wives was overbroad and archaic), and Reed, 404 U.S. at 73 (finding the assump-
tion that men were better estate administrators than women was overbroad and archaic), with
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (upholding a statutory
rape law that applied only to males because it was based on physical differences of the sexes
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The first cases involving the use of gender in criminal punishment far predated
current conceptions of equal protection and formulations of intermediate scrutiny.26
Although current usage of gender in criminal sentencing operates against the liberty
interests of men, early gender-based sentencing regimes resulted in harsher or in-
determinate sentences for women.27 As such, early equal protection challenges to
such sentencing systems were summarily dismissed.28 Conversely, in the few modern
instances in which gender has overtly been used in criminal sentencing, it has been
struck down as an equal rights violation. For example, in United States v. Maples,29
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized—as early as
1974—that gender could not be used to justify the judge’s decision to impose a
greater sentence on a male defendant.30 Likewise, in Williams v. Currie,31 the United
States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina found that the defen-
dant’s equal protection rights were violated because he received a much harsher sen-
tence than his similarly situated female co-defendant simply by virtue of being male.32
Cases like Maples and Currie are rare, however. Such disparate treatment between
genders is hardly as manifestly evident now as it was in those cases.33 Consequently,
the problem with gender variables in evidenced-based sentencing regimes is that it is
but one of a multitude of factors used to determine an offender’s recidivism risk.34 As
concerning pregnancy rather than social norms), and Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508 (upholding dif-
ferent treatment of male and female naval officers based on available professional opportunities).
26 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Race and Gender as Explicit Sentencing Factors, 14 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 127, 133–34 (2010).
27 See id. at 134–35.
28 See id. at 135 (detailing the various reasons courts rejected such challenges, including
deference to legislative judgment, psychological and anatomical differences, and biblical
references).
29 501 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1974).
30 Id. at 986–87 (noting that, where the female defendant received a ten-year sentence in
prison for a bank robbery but her male co-defendant received a fifteen-year sentence, part of
the reason she was shown leniency was based on “the fact that she was a woman”).
31 103 F. Supp. 2d 858 (M.D.N.C. 2000).
32 Id. at 868 (holding that gender discrimination accounted for “most, if not all” of the
reason that the male defendant received up to thirty-six years in prison while the female
codefendant received probation).
33 See Starr, supra note 3, at 824 (“There is . . . considerable statistical research sug-
gesting that judges (and prosecutors) do on average treat female defendants more leniently
than male defendants. But it is virtually unheard of for modern judges to say they are taking
gender into account . . . .” (citations omitted)).
34 For an overview of assessment instruments, see PAMELA M. CASEY, ROGER K. WARREN
& JENNIFER K. ELEK, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS
ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING: GUIDANCE FOR COURTS FROM A NATIONAL WORK-
ING GROUP app. A, at 4–9 (2011) (discussing the various factors examined by risk assessment
instruments and how each is further compartmentalized into indices, scales, and subscales);
J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based
Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1399–1402 app. (2011) (summarizing the variables used
in risk instruments).
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Professor Starr notes, litigation against the use of suspect variables in evidence-based
sentencing has been “slow in coming,” because “[t]he risk-prediction instruments are
not very transparent (some are proprietary corporate products), and defendants may not
understand the role of poverty and personal characteristics.”35 Additionally, Christopher
Slobogin recognizes that certain risk factors “might serve as a proxy” for other suspect
classifications.36 He notes, however, that such a claim is “likely” to fail unless the intent
behind such factors is grounded in a suspect classification.37 Accordingly, the covert
use of gender combined with the institutional obfuscation that often surrounds such
evidence-based methods provide high hurdles to constitutional challenges.38
Often, the fact that the variables are not uniformly considered creates another basic
obstacle to challenging an evidence-based sentencing regime. Not surprisingly, the use
of gender in risk assessment scores can appear in several ways.39 For example, some
states automatically assign males a higher score than females.40 Other states employ
different diversion cutoff risk scores for men and women.41 Other examples include
actuarial instruments that are tailored for a specific gender.42
35 Sonja B. Starr, Opinion, Sentencing, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/opinion/sentencing-by-the-numbers.html?_r=0.
36 Slobogin, supra note 2, at 204–05 (explaining that “employment and education status
could be statistical stand-ins for both race and age”).
37 Id. at 205.
38 Although a constitutional challenge to actuarial considerations in criminal sentencing
has yet to appear in federal court, at least one state supreme court accepted the validity of the
Level of Service Inventory—Revised (LSI-R). See Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564,
573–75 (Ind. 2010) (showing that the court accepted the wholesale validity of the LSI-R
without analyzing individual variables).
39 For example, North Carolina considers gender in its risk assessment, but it is unclear how
gender is used. See N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH FINDINGS AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CORRECTIONAL PROGRAM EVALUATIONS, 2000–2008,
at 12 (2009), http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/correctionalevalu
ation_0209.pdf [http://perma.cc/VS2R-ZMFS] (listing gender among social factors of risk).
40 See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk Assessment
in Criminal Sanctioning, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 158, 163 app.2 (2014) (highlighting that
Pennsylvania’s risk assessment instrument assigns females zero points and males one point);
BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN
VIRGINIA, 123 app.D (2002), http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/risk_off_rpt.pdf [http://www.perma
.cc/6DFD-92G6] (identifying that Virginia’s risk assessment form assigns male offenders an
extra point); WASH. STATE DEP’T OF CORR., STATIC RISK ASSESSMENT 1 (2007), http://www
.ofm.wa.gov/sgc/meetings/2008/06/SGCmeeting_20080613_StaticRiskAssessment.pdf
[http://www.perma.cc/3QLJ-GNQK] (highlighting that Washington’s static risk assessment
calculation assigns females no points and males one point).
41 See Edward Latessa et al., The Creation and Validation of the Ohio Risk Assessment
System (ORAS), 74 FED. PROBATION 16, 19 (2010) (highlighting that Ohio’s risk assessment
system employs different diversion cutoffs for men and women).
42 Compare Don Andrews et al., LS/CMI, MULTI-HEALTH SYSTEMS INC., http://www.mhs
.com/product.aspx?gr=saf&id=overview&prod=ls-cmi#scales [http://perma.cc/AN5W-JU4R] 
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Regardless of the system, such use of gender in evidence-based sentencing regimes
would disproportionately harm male offenders. Not only would higher overall risk
scores or lower risk cutoffs exclude otherwise appropriate male offenders from
diversionary programs, but such gender-driven scores could also lead to harsher
punishments.43 Although scrutiny over the use of suspect variables such as gender
in evidence-based sentencing has largely been washed away by the overwhelming tide
of support, it is important to note that widespread use or acceptance does not ensure
constitutionality.44 Before examining the effects of evidence-based sentencing on the
system as it is now, this Note will look to a brief bit of history as to where the
practice has been and how far it has quietly come.
II. THE MOVEMENT
A confluence of factors led to the explosion of evidence-based practices in the
criminal sentencing context, including advancements in social science, related legal
decisions, administrative and academic activism, and legislative initiatives.45 Notably,
evidence-based practices measuring risk assessment are not a new idea or invention,
(listing the LS/CMI ColorPlot Profile for Male Offenders Form among its risk assessment
instruments), with Women, NORTHPOINTE, http://www.northpointeinc.com/solutions/women
[http://perma.cc/9S9S-J6PT] (describing the Correctional Offender Management Profiling
for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) version designed specifically for women). See also
CORR. INST. FOR WOMEN OFFENDERS, Women’s Risk Needs Assessment, U. CIN., http://www
.uc.edu/womenoffenders.html [http://perma.cc/5FWW-HT72] (describing the joint efforts
between the University of Cincinnati and the National Institute of Corrections to create the
Women’s Risk/Needs Assessment (WRNA), and the Women’s Risk/Needs Assessment-Trailer
(WRNA-T)). The WRNA examines “both gender-neutral and gender-responsive factors and
affords separate forms for probation, prison, and pre-release.” Id. The WRNA-T is intended to
“supplement existing risk/needs assessments such as the Level of Service Inventory—Revised
or the Northpointe COMPAS.” Id.
43 See Starr, supra note 35 (“It is naïve to assume judges will use the scores only to reduce
sentences. Judges, especially elected ones, will face pressure to harshly sentence those labeled
‘high risk.’”); see also Slobogin, supra note 2, at 205 (noting that, under Virginia’s evidence-
based sentencing structure, “no young, unmarried, and unemployed male offender who has
any other aggravating factor (e.g., a prior crime) is eligible for diversion” (citation omitted));
Simone Weichselbaum & Thomas Zambito, Judged Bashes Probation Department for Gender
Bias in Favor of Leniency for Girls, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 1, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www
.nydailynews.com/news/crime/judged-bashes-probation-department-gender-bias-favor
-leniency-girls-article-1.473763 (noting that the judge found “probation routinely recom-
mended tougher treatment for boys”).
44 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 577–79 (2003) (criticizing Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
45 See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (outlining the development of social
science in relation to evidence-based practices); infra notes 59–70 and accompanying text
(summarizing relevant legal decisions); infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text (discussing
administrative overtures advocating for evidence based sentencing).
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because it has long been the goal of reformers to use science as a means to deter-
mine whether a criminal offender will relapse.46 As Scott VanBenschoten notes,
considering the “generations” of tools available to assess the factors underlying
criminality is the best way to understand the progression of risk assessment.47 The
first generation of risk prediction was based on the arresting police officer’s “use of
his or her clinical judgment.”48 The second generation of risk assessment began in
the 1920s with the Burgess Model,49 which “used an objective scale to measure static
offender characteristics.”50 The third generation of risk assessment tools started with
the Wisconsin Client Management Classification System in the late 1970s, which
combined static characteristics with mixed, modifiable factors to predict both the
risk and needs of a particular offender.51 Fourth generation risk prediction and needs
assessment tools integrate the case planning and assessment process to create “a
systematic intervention and monitoring system” for criminal offenders.52
The use of evidence-based risk assessment invariably gained traction shortly after
the development of the second generation actuarial methods.53 For some time, Illinois
was the only state that employed an evidence-based instrument in its parole decisions.54
46 See Starr, supra note 3, at 809 (“Recidivism risk prediction instruments have been devel-
oped by criminologists over nearly a century and used for a variety of correctional purposes.”
(citation omitted)); Oleson, supra note 34, at 1348 (“For nearly a century, social scientists have
endeavored to predict recidivism.”); Scott VanBenschoten, Risk/Needs Assessment: Is This
the Best We Can Do?, 72 FED. PROBATION 38, 38 (2008) (“Each generation utilized the most
advanced methods of the time to predict the risk of recidivism and then applied the results of
the assessment to supervision strategies. As the academic field of criminal justice developed,
so did the understanding of the etiology of criminal behavior.”).
47 VanBenschoten, supra note 46, at 38.
48 Id. at 39 (explaining that “clinical judgment” is drawn from the officer’s intuitive
knowledge and experience regarding which offenders were most likely to be successful or
unsuccessful in community supervision initiatives).
49 Ernest W. Burgess developed his model after studying thousands of Illinois parolees.
See HARCOURT, supra note 9, at 1; see also Oleson, supra note 34, at 1348 (noting that
Burgess’s variables ranged from an offender’s “father’s nationality to psychiatric prognosis”).
50 VanBenschoten, supra note 46, at 39 (noting that the Burgess Model ushered in a wave
of further refined second-generation assessment scales, culminating in the 1970s with the
federal Salient Factors Score). For an overview of early risk prediction instruments, see
Oleson, supra note 34, at 1348.
51 VanBenschoten, supra note 46, at 39. The author notes that third-generation tools like
the LSI-R weigh negative and positive changes in an offender’s situation. Id. The needs
assessment is thus used alongside traditional risk prediction in these regimes. Id.
52 Id. (identifying the Level of Service Case Management Inventory as the most popular
fourth generation tool).
53 See HARCOURT, supra note 9, at 1 (describing how Ferris Laune, one of Burgess’s
former students, worked for the Illinois parole board and ushered in the widespread use of
actuarial methods into criminal law as early as the 1930s).
54 See id. at 8, 77.
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Ohio followed suit in the 1960s, along with California in the 1970s.55 The federal
government also began using risk assessment methods in the 1970s with its intro-
duction of the Salient Factors Score.56 Several other states added actuarial methods
based on this precedent, and the practice exploded during the 1980s.57 Undoubtedly,
the proliferation of evidence-based practices in parole decisions provided a conve-
nient segue into the sentencing context.58
Additionally, a line of Supreme Court decisions considerably expanded “the shift
toward discretionary sentencing.”59 Starting with Apprendi v. New Jersey,60 the
Supreme Court held that, in order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a
trial by jury, any factor (other than a prior criminal conviction) that raised a sentence
beyond the statutory maximum had to be accepted by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.61 In the risk assessment context, Slobogin reasons that “Apprendi might also
require a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to each individual risk
factor.”62 He notes, however, that such an outcome is likely to have a “minimal” impact
on evidence-based risk assessment because “most non-capital sentences based on
risk stay within statutory and guideline ranges.”63
In Blakely v. Washington,64 the Supreme Court held that Washington’s sentenc-
ing guidelines also violated the Sixth Amendment.65 In United States v. Booker,66 the
following term, the Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were subject
to (and several provisions were subsequently violative of) the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee to a trial by jury.67 Essentially, the Court excised those portions of the
sentencing guidelines that suggested they were mandatory.68 Presently, judges are
therefore allowed to consult the guidelines but are not required to stay within the
recommended sentencing bounds.69 As Peter Krupp notes, “[W]hile trial courts will
55 See id.
56 See VanBenschoten, supra note 46, at 39 (also noting that probationers were examined
using the “U.S.D.C. 75 Scale, which was later modified into the Risk Prediction Scale 80”);
see also HARCOURT, supra note 9, at 8, 77.
57 See HARCOURT, supra note 9, at 8, 77; Starr, supra note 3, at 809.
58 See HARCOURT, supra note 9, at 88 (“The meteoric rise of parole-prediction instru-
ments—and especially the development of the federal Salient Factor Score—coincided with
a more general turn to actuarial methods in a number of other criminal justice arenas.”).
59 Starr, supra note 3, at 811.
60 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
61 Id. at 490.
62 Slobogin, supra note 2, at 203–04.
63 Id. at 204.
64 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
65 Id. at 303–04.
66 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
67 Id. at 245.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 251–52 (“Judges have long looked to real conduct when sentencing. Federal judges
have long relied upon a presentence report, prepared by a probation officer, for information
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still be required to consider the Guidelines, they will not be required to impose the
Guidelines sentence, and will have to consider other more traditional sentencing
factors in each defendant’s case.”70 Combined, the rulings in Apprendi, Blakely, and
Booker allow both state and federal judges to exercise greater discretion when doling
out punishments, discretion invariably swayed by pre-sentencing reports including
evidence-based risk assessments.
After the Apprendi line of cases came to its logical conclusion, the use of
evidence-based sentencing ripened into prevalence in part due to a formal resolution
from the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Adminis-
trators71 along with a joint report by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC),
the Crime and Justice Institute, and the National Institute of Corrections,72 both of
which were released in 2007.73 A rash of administrative overtures advocating the
spread of evidence-based sentencing followed.74 In fact, the NCSC has continued
to reaffirm its support of evidence-based practices in criminal sentencing.75 For exam-
ple, as recently as 2011, a working group for the NCSC enthusiastically embraced
(often unavailable until after the trial) relevant to the manner in which the convicted offender
committed the crime of conviction.”).
70 Peter B. Krupp, The Return of Judicial Discretion: Federal Sentencing Under “Advi-
sory” Guidelines After United States v. Booker, 49 BOS. B.J. 18, 18 (2005).
71 CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES & CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, RESO-
LUTION 12: IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCING PRACTICES THAT PROMOTE PUBLIC SAFETY AND
REDUCE RECIDIVISM (2007), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/Resolution
-12.ashx [http://perma.cc/L97Q-HMWE] (resolving to support states’ adoptions of evidence-
based sentencing).
72 ROGER K. WARREN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE JUDICIARIES
3, 25, 62 (2007), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/023358.pdf [http://perma
.cc/MFZ9-9ZLR] (analyzing how to effectively implement evidence-based sentencing in state
courts).
73 See Starr, supra note 3, at 811; Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: Are We
Up to the Task?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 153, 153 (2010).
74 See, e.g., DAVID BALL & KARA DANSKY, STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., COOR-
DINATION AT THE FRONT-END OF SENTENCING: THE JUDICIARY, PROBATION, AND THE PRE-
SENTENCE REPORT (2008), http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-page/266901
/doc/slspublic/Crim_030708_Report_lr_071008.pdf [http://perma.cc/68UP-883M] (evalu-
ating the status of pre-sentencing reports in California); RYAN S. KING, SENTENCING PROJECT,
THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2007: DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 24 (2008), http://
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sl_statesentencingreport2007.pdf [http://perma
.cc/H67Y-6S68] (identifying “the need to rely upon evidence-based practices to govern policy
directions”); ROGER K. WARREN, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ARMING THE COURTS WITH
RESEARCH: 10 EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING INITIATIVES TO CONTROL CRIME AND REDUCE
COSTS 1–4 (2009), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/PEW_ArmingThe
CourtWithResearch.ashx [http://perma.cc/DU87-XGQW] (advocating the effectiveness and
efficiency of evidence-based practices).
75 See CASEY, WARREN & ELEK, supra note 34.
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and endorsed evidence-based practices for reducing recidivism.76 Evidence-based
sentencing has even found support in drafts of the forthcoming revision of the Model
Penal Code.77
In fact, according to Douglas A. Berman, nearly every state has adopted or
considered using evidence-based research in criminal sentencing.78 Virginia was the
first state to adopt an evidence-based risk assessment tool through passage of its
Truth-in-Sentencing Act of 1994.79 Professor Starr’s recent analysis revealed that some
twenty state courts now officially incorporate evidence-based practices into sentencing
decisions.80 In all, the states that use some form of evidence-based sentencing include:
Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Illinois, New Mexico, North Dakota, Maine,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin.81 As previously discussed, at least
one-fourth of those states explicitly include gender as a variable in their evidence-
based sentencing regimes.82 Now that this Note has examined why, how, and where
evidence-based sentencing is currently being used, it will turn to the governmental
objectives used to support such regimes and the unsettled empirical tailoring behind
such actuarial instruments.
III. THE OBJECTIVES
The prevalence and increased acceptance of evidence-based sentencing make
those jurisdictions that consider gender as a measure of risk all the more troubling.
Chief amongst the concerns is how such gender-driven mechanisms uniformly
operate against the liberty interests of male offenders. As Professor Starr notes, “If
the instrument includes gender, men will always receive higher risk scores than
otherwise-identical women . . . even if the context is one in which men and women
76 See id. at 1–3 (advocating the use of evidence-based sentencing).
77 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2,
2011).
78 Douglas A. Berman, Are Costs a Unique (and Uniquely Problematic) Kind of Sentenc-
ing Data?, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 159, 160 (2012).
79 VA. CODE ANN. § 17-235 (West 1995); see also Starr, supra note 3, at 809 (discussing
how Virginia began the trend towards state adoption of evidence-based sentencing); OSTROM
ET AL., supra note 40, at 9–10 (discussing Virginia’s reasons for adoption); Slobogin, supra
note 2, at 202 (discussing Virginia’s policy justifications and statewide adoption of evidence-
based sentencing).
80 Starr, supra note 3, at 809–10 n.11. Professor Starr notes that at least twelve states have
incorporated actuarial instruments into sentencing decisions through legislation, state sentencing
commission policy, or state supreme court decisions. Id. Evidence-based sentencing pilot pro-
grams exist in certain jurisdictions of at least three additional states. Id. Case law and official
reports show that evidence-based sentencing is a de facto policy in five more states. Id.
81 See id.
82 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
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tend to have similar recidivism risks or in which women have higher risks.”83 The
notion that the inclusion of gender in evidence-based sentencing would survive a
constitutional challenge has largely been treated as a foregone conclusion.84 Such
analyses often accept the inclusion of gender in risk assessment instruments as valid
without actually going through the heavy legal lifting.85
In order to withstand an equal protection challenge under intermediate scrutiny,
considerations of gender in the sentencing context “must serve important governmental
objectives.”86 As previously mentioned, administrative ease and convenience are insuf-
ficient,87 and the objectives cannot be theoretical.88 The Supreme Court has long held
that “[t]he ‘legitimate and compelling state interest’ in protecting the community from
crime cannot be doubted.”89 Public safety and, consequently, crime prevention are
explicitly at the heart of many evidence-based sentencing regimes.90 The logic, pre-
sumably, is that imprisoning those offenders who pose the highest risk of recidivating
will shrink the total number of crimes committed. Additionally, when Virginia adopted
its evidence-based sentencing regime in 1994, it was, at least in part, motivated by
the desire to reduce incarceration rates.91 Following Virginia’s example, other states
have adopted evidence-based sentencing to divert offenders into alternative sentences
as well.92
83 See Starr, supra note 3, at 813 (citation omitted) (noting that risk assessments typically
do not account for gender differences such as women’s higher rates of recidivism for drug
crimes).
84 See Oleson, supra note 34, at 1376, 1387; Slobogin, supra note 2, at 204–05; John
Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators,
and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 430–32 (2006).
85 See Starr, supra note 3, at 820, 824 (criticizing scholars’ acceptance of evidence-based
sentencing’s constitutionality by analyzing due process cases in the Supreme Court).
86 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
87 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 656 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).
88 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535–36 (1996).
89 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984); see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52
(1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960).
90 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.007(1) (West 2011) (“The primary objective of sentencing
shall be to maintain public safety and hold offenders accountable while reducing recidivism
and criminal behavior and improving outcomes for those offenders who are sentenced.”);
VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-801 (West 2011) (“The Commission shall develop discretionary sen-
tencing guidelines to achieve the goals of certainty, consistency, and adequacy of punishment
with due regard to the seriousness of the offense, the dangerousness of the offender, deter-
rence of individuals from committing criminal offenses and the use of alternative sanctions,
where appropriate.”).
91 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 40, at 9 n.1 (noting that the Virginia General Assembly
wanted the newly formed sentencing commission to assess “the feasibility of placing 25
percent of nonviolent offenders in alternative sanctions based on a risk assessment instru-
ment that identifies offenders with the lowest risk to public safety”).
92 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.7(d) (2010) (“Subject to the eligibility requirements
of each program, the risk assessment instrument may be an aide to help determine appropriate
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The fact that public safety is a legitimate governmental interest is indisputable.
Moreover, crime prevention and reducing incarceration are both important and
concrete goals. Neither is a matter of administrative ease or convenience (although
the actuarial instruments adopted to achieve such goals arguably are). However, to
allow the states that include gender in their evidence-based sentencing regimes to
point to a legitimate purpose and simply claim victory would do an injustice to the
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. Namely, the states’ use of gender classifica-
tion in evidence-based sentencing regimes must actually “serve” its objectives. Whether
the inclusion of gender in actuarial risk assessment instruments truly serves the
state’s interests is a far more open-ended question.
A. Crime Prevention
Given the swelling number of individuals in the corrections system,93 it is
understandable that states would branch into evidence-based practices to increase
efficiency while reducing the aggregate number of crimes committed. As a matter
of general deterrence, however, it is unclear how individual risk assessment furthers
the goal of preventing crimes. Logically, sentences influenced by risk assessment
scores based on independent characteristics of each offender would have little to no
generalizability in the overall population.
Bernard E. Harcourt accepts the notion that “using an accurate parole-prediction
tool will likely increase the success rate of parolees,” but he questions the overarch-
ing rationale behind economic models of discriminatory profiling.94 Harcourt argues
that profiling based on a group trait to predict higher offending will only generate
a net benefit to society if “the members of the higher-offending targeted group have
the same or greater elasticity of offending to policing.”95 According to Harcourt,
profiling will actually increase crime if “the targeted population is less responsive
to the change in policing.”96 Just as individual racial minorities respond differently
to policing practices,97 it could well be the fact that assigning higher risk scores to
males ignores the underlying causes of their unique patterns of offending. Thus,
considerations of gender (and the interposing notion that males are more criminal)
in evidence-based sentencing likely have no bearing on overall crime rates.
candidates for alternative sentencing, including the recidivism risk reduction incentive, State
and county intermediate punishment programs and State motivational boot camps.”).
93 See, e.g., Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles
of Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585,
589–91 (2009) (highlighting the six-fold increase in federal prison population between 1974
and 2005, as well as an increase in inmates in local jails and on parole or suspension).
94 HARCOURT, supra note 9, at 123.
95 Id. at 122–23.
96 Id. at 123.
97 Id.
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It is also questionable whether evidence-based sentencing succeeds in matters
of specific deterrence. Apart from those offenders who are recommended for alternative
sanctions, recidivism remains a significant problem for those offenders who are, in
fact, incarcerated. For example, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, “67.8%
of the 404,638 state prisoners released in 2005 in 30 states were arrested within 3
years of release, and 76.6% were arrested within 5 years of release.”98 The Bureau
also found that “69.0% of male and 58.5% of female inmates had been arrested at
least once” within three years of release, and that “more than three-quarters (77.6%)
of males and two-thirds (68.1%) of females had been arrested” within five years of
release.99 Thus, if evidence-based sentencing systems are aimed at reducing rates of
recidivism, they still have a great deal of ground to gain.
Moreover, it is possible that an individual’s level of risk in the abstract has little
bearing on his or her concrete risk of recidivating in real life. As Professor Starr
notes, “There is no intuitive reason to assume that the specific-deterrence effect is
determined by, or even correlated with, the defendant’s recidivism risk level. . . .
[H]igher-risk defendants . . . might be more inelastic to specific deterrence and
rehabilitation and might be more vulnerable to the possible criminogenic effects of
incarceration.”100 This effect demonstrates the limited utility of incarceration and its
overall diminishing rates of return.101 It is entirely plausible that those offenders who
are incarcerated are more likely to recidivate, given the correlation between time
spent in prison and likelihood of becoming a career criminal.102 Thus, the identifica-
tion of medium or high-risk offenders through evidence-based sentencing may in
fact result in a self-fulfilling prophecy in terms of recidivism.
98 MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010,
at 1 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf [http://perma.cc/5FUY
-HDQ9]. From the available data for those prisoners released in 2005, 49.7% recidivated within
three years and were sent to prison, and that number rose to 55.1% within five years. Id.
99 Id. at 11.
100 Starr, supra note 3, at 857. Starr goes on to state that increasing a high-risk offender’s
sentence might contribute to the risk that he or she poses once released. Id.
101 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 93, at 593–96 (discussing various findings that incarceration
generally does not result in a net reduction of crime).
102 See, e.g., Lawrence L. Bench & Terry D. Allen, Investigating the Stigma of Prison
Classification: An Experimental Design, 83 PRISON J. 367 (2003) (suggesting that classi-
fication labels are a result of an offender’s behavior rather than a reflection of an offender’s
characteristics); M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce
Recidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2007) (finding that
those offenders placed in higher-security prisons reoffend at a higher rate than those in
lower-security prisons); Gerald G. Gaes & Scott D. Camp, Unintended Consequences:
Experimental Evidence for the Criminogenic Effect of Prison Security Level Placement on
Post-Release Recidivism, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 139 (2009) (finding that higher
security levels increase recidivism).
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Finally, proponents of gender in evidence-based sentencing hardly consider the
external effects such regimes may have. Conversely, the proponents of overtly gendered
sentencing almost always do. For example, some academics support the explicit
consideration of gender in sentencing based on the notion that gender-neutrality
harms women.103 The effects of gender-neutral sentencing on children are even more
concerning.104 Notably, the use of gender in evidence-based sentencing has done
little to improve the situations of individual female offenders,105 which begs the
question of how increased disparate treatment between men and women in the crim-
inal justice system would alleviate the negative externalities of incarceration.
Furthermore, to claim that these problems are uniquely borne by women is a
dangerously constrictive viewpoint. Overtly gendered sentencing not only ignores
the effects of absenteeism on the children of incarcerated fathers,106 it also ignores
the societal shifts that are constraining men through gender expectations as well.107
Accordingly, high rates of incarcerated fathers have almost certainly contributed to
instances of inter-generational crime.
103 See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker Federal Guidelines
World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 692 (2006) (“The Guidelines’ concerted effort to produce
identical sentences for men and women who commit similar crimes, while never completely
successful, imposed draconian costs on families as well as on women who do not resemble
the violent male drug dealers who inspired the severe federal drug penalties.”).
104 See id. at 756 (referring to an “orphan-class” of children destined to follow in the
footsteps of their incarcerated mothers); see also Randolph R. Myers & Sara Wakefield, Sex,
Gender, and Imprisonment: Rates, Reforms, and Lived Realities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF GENDER, SEX, AND CRIME 572, 578 (Rosemary Gartner & Bill McCarthy eds., 2014)
(noting that the Adopting and Safe Families Act of 1997 makes it more likely that incarcerated
women will lose their children).
105 For example, from 2010 to 2013—arguably the height of evidence-based sentencing—the
national female jail population was “the fastest growing correctional population.” GLAZE &
KAEBLE, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that the female jail population has increased by an
annual average of 3.4%).
106 See, e.g., Gwyneth Boswell, Imprisoned Fathers: The Children’s View, 41 HOW. J.
CRIM. JUST. 14, 14 (2002) (researching the effect of incarcerated fathers have on children);
Stewart Gabel, Behavioral Problems in Sons of Incarcerated or Otherwise Absent Fathers:
The Issue of Separation, 31 FAM. PROCESS 303, 303 (1992) (studying the effects of absentee
fathers who are incarcerated versus those that are absent for other reasons); Amanda Geller
et al., Beyond Absenteeism: Father Incarceration and Child Development, 49 DEMOGRAPHY
49, 50–52 (2012) (analyzing the effects of fathers’ incarceration on children and finding
increased risks for children with incarcerated fathers when compared with children with
absentee fathers); William H. Sack, Children of Imprisoned Fathers, 40 PSYCHIATRY 163,
163 (1977) (exploring the consequences of father-separation as a result of imprisonment).
107 Kirstine Hansen, Gender Differences in Self-Reported Offending, in GENDER AND
JUSTICE: NEW CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES 32, 37 (Frances Heidensohn ed., 2006) (“[M]any
absent fathers face high levels of both financial and emotional strain in maintaining the family
home and their relationships with their children despite the fact that they are no longer living
as part of that family.”).
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Additionally, incarcerating fewer men could remedy many of the “gendered
consequences” resulting from mass incarceration. For example, Randolph R. Myers
and Sara Wakefield claim that women in high-crime neighborhoods face child care
burdens and diminished marriage prospects.108 According to Myers and Wakefield,
women are gradually devoting more time, resources, and money to incarcerated
partners.109 However, such “gendered” problems could easily be remedied if the state
reduced the number of men who were incarcerated. Increased emotional stability
and financial support from otherwise imprisoned parents and partners would un-
doubtedly reduce crime rates.
Clearly, evidence-based sentencing regimes pose no logical relationship to
theories of general deterrence. Soaring rates of recidivism call into question whether
such systems have been more successful in creating high-risk offenders than they
have been in identifying low-risk offenders. Finally, if states truly wanted to increase
their commitment to public safety, they would excise considerations of gender from
their evidence-based sentencing regimes in order to promote intact family units. Crime
prevention, however, is only one of the general governmental objectives. On a related,
yet distinct note, it is also questionable whether considerations of gender reduce
instances of incarceration as well.
B. Reducing Incarceration
Reducing incarceration rates may be a legitimate government interest, but it seems
to be working disproportionately better for women relative to the offending popula-
tion as a whole. For example, Barry Godfrey identifies the long-held notion that
women offenders showed “greater promise of reformation.”110 This notion, Godfrey
notes, finds its roots in the Victorian ideal of femininity and “the apparent malleabil-
ity of the female will.”111 Thus, it appears as though alternative sentencing has always
been geared toward, if not tailor-made for, women.112 Alternatives to full-blown
incarceration, it seems, have long been comfortably nestled in conceptions of gender.
The chivalry thesis, which assumes that stereotypes about the sexes influence
sentencing outcomes, supports this notion.113 This thesis also helps to explain why
108 Myers & Wakefield, supra note 104, at 579.
109 Id.
110 Barry Godfrey, A Historical Perspective on Criminal Justice Responses to Female and
Male Offending, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENDER, SEX, AND CRIME 158, 168 (Rosemary
Gartner & Bill McCarthy eds., 2014).
111 Id.
112 Such characterizations, if forwarded, would summarily fail considering they are the
epitome of “archaic and overbroad.” See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976)
(citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507–08 (1975)).
113 See Courtney A. Franklin & Noelle E. Fearn, Gender, Race, and Formal Court Decision-
Making Outcomes: Chivalry/Paternalism, Conflict Theory or Gender Conflict?, 36 J. CRIM.
JUST. 279, 279 (2008) (“The chivalry/paternalism hypotheses suggest that women are awarded
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men are sentenced more often and for longer periods of time than women.114 In this
sense, considerations of gender in evidence-based sentencing (which impute risk to
men at-large) seem to be reinforcing, rather than replacing, the institutional biases
they are intended to eradicate.115 If women offenders automatically received a lower
risk assessment score than men,116 then they will surely be recommended for alternative
sentences more often. Thus, a better question in evaluating whether evidence-based
sentencing reduces incarceration is asking whom the system diverts rather than how
many the system diverts.
Additionally, in breaking down the types of alternative sentences assigned, in-
carceration still seems to be very much on the table. In Virginia, for example, a jail
sentence of less than twelve months was still imposed in 50.9% of the cases that
were eligible for an alternative sentence.117 At mid-year 2013, nearly 40% of inmates
in jail were either sentenced offenders or convicted offenders awaiting sentencing.118
Notably, since the year 2000, the adult female jail population has increased by 2.6
percentage points (or 31,503 inmates) to encompass 13.9% of the total jail popula-
tion.119 Although it is impossible to account for how many women reflected in that
figure were in jail due to alternative and, subsequently more lenient, punishments,
it is entirely feasible that the uptick could be attributed to discretionary downward
departures in lieu of a much longer prison sentence. At any rate, the jailed population
still remains relatively high.120 Thus, another question in evaluating whether evidence-
based sentencing reduces incarceration is where an offender is incarcerated rather
than if an offender is incarcerated.
leniency in sentencing as a result of their inherent biological weaknesses and consequently,
their need to be protected and coddled both as offenders and as victims.” (citation omitted));
S. Fernando Rodriguez et al., Gender Differences in Criminal Sentencing: Do Effects Vary
Across Violent, Property, and Drug Offenses?, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 318, 320 (2006) (“Sometimes
called paternalism, chivalry asserts that women are stereotyped as fickle and childlike, and
therefore not fully responsible for their criminal behavior.”).
114 See Rodriguez et al., supra note 113, at 334 (finding that men were more likely to
receive prison sentences 3.22 years longer than women); see also Sonja B. Starr, Estimating
Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases 2 (U. Mich. L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series,
Paper No. 12-018, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144002 (find-
ing that men received prison sentences 63% longer than women).
115 See Rodriguez et al., supra note 113, at 335; Starr, supra note 114, at 16.
116 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
117 See VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2013), http://
www.vcsc.virginia.gov/2013AnnualReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/PY75-6SMC]. Supervised
probation was the most popular type of alternative sanction (86.3%). Id.
118 TODD D. MINTON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2013—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2014), http://www
.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim13st.pdf [http://perma.cc/VW3J-ZE9Q].
119 Id. at 6–7 tbls.2–3.
120 See id. at 6 tbl.2 (noting that the mid-year number of jailed inmates totaled 731,208).
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Furthermore, as far as nonviolent offenders are concerned, how evidence-based
sentencing stacks up to the states’ listed purposes can be more concretely deter-
mined. For example, Virginia set out with the admirable goal of diverting 25% of
its nonviolent offenders when it adopted its “truth-in-sentencing” guidelines in
1994.121 According to the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission in 2013, almost
two-thirds (roughly 16,020) of the files it received were for nonviolent crimes.122 Of
those reports, only 41% (or 6,568 cases) were eligible for an alternative sanction.123
In all, 53% of eligible nonviolent offenders (roughly 3,481 cases) were recom-
mended for an alternative punishment.124 Of that 53%, only 42% (or roughly 1,462)
of those recommended actually received an alternative punishment.125
Alone, this statistic seems like no small victory. In light of the larger picture,
however, Virginia falls short of its goal to divert 25% of nonviolent offenders. For
example, the 1,462 individuals who received alternative sanctions comprise only
about 9% of the total non-violent offending population. In order for Virginia to meet
its goal in 2013, no less than 61% of eligible nonviolent offenders needed to receive
alternative sanctions. In terms of human capital, this means roughly 2,543 more of-
fenders could have been diverted from prison. A final question in evaluating whether
evidence-based sentencing reduces incarceration is how many more offenders could be
diverted rather than how many offenders were diverted.
In sum, although the ends are indisputably noble, it is questionable whether
gender considerations in risk assessment instruments truly serve any real, concrete,
legitimate governmental objectives related to preventing crime and reducing incar-
ceration. Overall, failures as a matter of general deterrence, high recidivism rates,
and familial instability muddy evidence-based sentencing’s net effects on overall
crime prevention. As far as reducing incarceration rates, risk assessment does seem to
marginally help some low-risk offenders, but it is clear that much more could be
done. The argument against the use of gender in evidence-based sentencing does not
summarily there end, however. Now that this Note has examined the government ob-
jectives, it can finally discuss how the use of gender is poorly tailored to fit those ends.
IV. THE MEANS
In spite of the fact that gender-driven risk assessments often subvert the legiti-
mate objectives behind alternative sentencing regimes, the complicity with which
121 VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 117, at 33.
122 Id.
123 Id. Offenders convicted for distributing cocaine, a violent felony, or a crime that re-
quires a mandatory minimum sentence are ineligible for the risk assessment. Id. Nonviolent
offenders recommended for probation based on the guidelines are not eligible for assessment.
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gender has been enveloped in evidence-based practice is quite troubling. The pre-
sumption driving this unquestioning inclusion, it seems, is that gender can be a some-
what reliable (if quite feeble) predictor of adult recidivism.126 Acceptance of this
indicator is bolstered by the simple fact that men commit more crimes than women.127
Such statements, without more detail, border on the tautological. They add little to
no scientific justifications for gender inclusion in evidence-based sentencing, and
they hardly assuage fears concerning empirical tailoring when the conversation shifts
to employing gender punitively rather than passively studying it.
As a quasi-suspect variable, the government’s use of gender classifications must
be “substantially related” to the proffered objectives.128 The doctrine eventually required
an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for gender classifications.129 In other words,
the use of gender in criminal sentencing must be closely tied to identifying low-risk
offenders who are appropriate for commuted sentences or community release. Rather
than peel back the layers of complications, the literature that has thus far examined
the use of gender in evidence-based sentencing has shown an almost blind faith in
decades’ old empirical assessment.130 Persistent problems surrounding the ill-suited
analogies include the acceptable use of suspect variables, the reliability of assump-
tions drawn from historical data, and the fuzzy conceptions of gender as a social
construct.131 To demonstrate that the use of gender in evidence-based sentencing
regimes fails as a matter of fitness, this Section will situate the question in existing
constitutional doctrine concerning the totality of factors under consideration, statistical
assumptions about the genders, and physical characteristics between the sexes.
A. The Affirmative Action Analogy
One of the most disconcerting arguments in favor of using suspect variables
analogizes the use of gender in evidence-based sentencing to the use of race in the
affirmative action context. J.C. Oleson forwards such an argument, claiming that
126 See, e.g., Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little & Claire Goggin, A Meta-Analysis of the Pre-
dictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 576 (1996)
(discussing the inclusion and predictive strength of gender in risk assessment instruments);
Oleson, supra note 34, at 1365–66 (discussing gender as a generally accepted variable);
Starr, supra note 3, at 828 (“EBS is all about generalizing based on statistical averages, and
its advocates defend it on the basis that the averages are right.”).
127 See Oleson, supra note 34, at 1365 (noting that, regardless of how crime is measured,
“males are more criminal than females”).
128 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75
(1971)).
129 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136–37 (1994); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
130 For example, Gendreau, Little, and Goggin’s oft-cited meta-analysis of recidivism markers
is nearly twenty years old. See Gendreau, Little & Goggin, supra note 126, at 575.
131 See Meares, supra note 9, at 853–57 (discussing the reluctance of lawyers, judges, and
others to embrace updated, relevant empirical information and social science data).
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such variables invariably survive intermediate scrutiny.132 In fact, according to
Oleson, the inclusion of race in risk assessment may even survive strict scrutiny.133
Oleson seems to accept that the overt use of race or gender alone would hardly pass
constitutional muster under the Equal Protection Clause.134 However, Oleson be-
lieves that it is plausible to think that the courts would look favorably upon an
evidence-based sentencing regime that blended the use of suspect variables along
with traditionally accepted considerations.135 When used as such, either explicitly
or implicitly, Oleson argues that “suspect classifications might operate as ‘plus
factors,’ allowing judges to assess risk with greater precision to advance the compel-
ling state interest of public safety.”136 “Such an approach,” Oleson writes, “may sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny.”137
In order to lend support to this argument, Oleson points to one of the Supreme
Court’s now seminal cases on affirmative action,138 Grutter v. Bollinger.139 Initially, the
fact that Oleson conflates the possibility with not getting into a “top tier” law school
with the possibility of spending time in prison is itself concerning. Perhaps the most
striking feature of Oleson’s argument, however, is how thoroughly wrong he gets the
Court’s analysis in Grutter (although, to his credit, he does at least attempt to defend,
rather than blasély accept, the use of constitutionally suspect variables in evidence-
based sentencing).140
In his explanation of how race could be used as an explicit risk assessment factor,
Oleson latches onto a few salient features of the Grutter opinion. In particular, he points
to the Court’s acceptance of racial considerations so long as they were: (1) employed
in a “flexible and non-mechanical manner”; (2) applied as “plus factors”; and (3) in-
cluded among various other relevant variables.141 Granted, the explicit consideration
of gender is but one factor amongst several other highly relevant variables in many
evidence-based sentencing regimes, which often compile a large number of both static
132 Oleson, supra note 34, at 1385–88.
133 Id.
134 See id. at 1377; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. amend. V.
135 Oleson, supra note 34, at 1377.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1381–82.
139 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the law school’s use of race in admissions because the
program was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest of attaining a diverse study body).
140 See Oleson, supra note 34, at 1385–88. Importantly, Oleson even uses the Grutter
argument to justify the explicit use of race in evidence-based sentencing. Id. He believes that
risk assessments based on race would survive strict scrutiny. Id. Even though the race
analysis employs a higher level of scrutiny than the one applied to gender, Oleson’s misap-
plication of the tailoring arguments can just as easily be applied to the use of gender under
intermediate scrutiny for reasons that will be explained below.
141 Id. at 1383–84, 1386 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333–35).
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and dynamic inquiries.142 However, the similarities between affirmative action and
evidence-based sentencing sharply end there.143
For example, the Court has held that race can be used as a “plus” factor for ad-
mission purposes so long as such a consideration does not isolate applicants from
the larger pool of candidates competing for available seats.144 In the university admis-
sions context, race is used as a positive factor.145 An applicant’s contribution to
diversity is considered an overall benefit to the institution.146 As such, “plus” factors
based on race or ethnicity could give such applicants a slight, but not dispositive,
edge over racial or ethnic majority applicants.147 In contrast, when gender is used for
purposes of risk assessment, it is a neutral factor for women at best and a negative
factor for men at worst.148 Evidence-based sentencing regimes that automatically add
to the risk assessment of men function as “minus” factors instead by increasing the
likelihood that male offenders will not be considered for community diversion.149
Thus, the inclusion of gender in the criminal sentencing context operates contrari-
wise to the accepted practices in the affirmative action context.150
Furthermore, the Court in Grutter noted that the consideration of race in the
admissions program had to “be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way.”151 Although
evidence-based sentencing regimes do not establish quotas or insulate certain groups
of offenders from the larger criminal population, evidence-based sentencing has
been lauded for its actuarial rigidity and administrative efficiency.152 In fact, the
evidence-based movement was developed to make the law more scientific: actuarial
instruments were purportedly more accurate than the clinical judgment of arresting of-
ficers or sentencing judges.153 Thus, advocates for evidence-based sentencing support
142 See CASEY, WARREN & ELEK, supra note 34, at 4–5 (discussing the numerous factors
examined in popular risk assessment instruments).
143 See, e.g., Starr, supra note 3, at 864 (contrasting the state’s differing interests in affir-
mative action and criminal justice).
144 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (stating that the University of Michigan Law School used
race as a constitutionally permissible “plus factor”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (allowing universities to use race as a factor for admission).
145 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340–41.
146 See id. at 330.
147 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
148 See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
149 See id.
150 In fact, a more apposite comparison to how gender is used in evidence-based sentencing
would be an admissions program that subtracted points from white applicants.
151 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
152 See, e.g., Oleson, supra note 34, at 1342 (claiming that actuarial risk assessment
outperforms clinical judgment); Starr, supra note 3, at 850–55 (comparing the accuracy of
evidence-based versus clinical judgments); VanBenschoten, supra note 46, at 39 (discussing
the objectivity of evidence-based risk assessment and its usefulness in case planning).
153 See VanBenschoten, supra note 46, at 38–39.
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such practices precisely because they are inflexible and mechanic.154 Again, the exact
opposite of the program in Grutter.
Finally, in his myopic pursuit of support, Oleson either ignores or overlooks
Grutter’s most important hallmark—individual considerations. The law school’s
admissions program was upheld because it utilized “a highly individualized, holistic
review of each applicant’s file,” and there was no practice of “automatic acceptance
or rejection based on any single ‘soft’ variable” such as demographic information.155
The statistical averages used to support the use of gender in evidence-based sentencing
are incompatible with the Grutter Court’s conception of a “highly individualized,”
let alone “holistic” review of each offender’s characteristics.156
Although the tailoring analogy between criminal sentencing and higher educa-
tion may be a novel twist on an otherwise unjustified embrace of suspect variables,
the reasoning is inept as applied to the affirmative action doctrine and evidence-
based sentencing context. Such an argument might be one of the most disturbing
offered to defend evidence-based sentencing, but it is also the easiest with which to
dispose. More complex problems are posed by reliance on statistics surrounding the
historical patterns and prevalence of male offenders and the notion that criminality
is a largely masculine characteristic.
B. The Reliability of Historical and Statistical Data
The gender divide in criminal offending is another factor proponents of evidence-
based sentencing highlight in support of gender in risk assessment instruments. For
example, Oleson summarizes the general thrust of this line of reasoning when he
argues, essentially, that men have committed more crimes and have recidivated at
a higher frequency than women since time immemorial.157 Disciplines outside of the
law have lent credence to this claim as well.158 For example, economic theory defends
such statistical discrimination on the basis that it is more efficient.159 Likewise, con-
cepts of “actuarial fairness” have been used by insurance companies to justify dis-
parate rates among certain groups.160
154 See Starr, supra note 3, at 813.
155 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
156 In fact, as a matter of comparison, the distribution of points based on gender is more
akin to the system struck down in Grutter’s companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003), which held that the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program,
which automatically assigned one-fifth of the points needed for admission to racial minorities,
was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 246.
157 Oleson, supra note 34, at 1365–66.
158 See generally Starr, supra note 3 (analyzing the use of actuarial models to reduce
recidivism risks).
159 Id. at 827.
160 Id. at 825 n.91.
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Much like the affirmative action context, the comparative interests are incom-
patible. The interest in not going to prison is far more sobering than generalized
market forces or paying a lower insurance premium. Furthermore, anecdotally citing
base statistics adds little to the argument that the use of gender in evidence-based
sentencing should continue to skate by unscathed from criticism. As Tammy
Whitlock writes, “To say that crime itself has largely been a historically masculine
enterprise is a statistically factual statement but not a particularly revealing one.”161
Finally, such reedy arguments would certainly bow under intermediate scrutiny.
In more applicable doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that statistical assump-
tions based on gender cannot serve as a proxy for “other, more germane bases of
classification.”162 This is true even when such gender classifications have been
statistically supported.163 Statistics played a large role in the state’s case in Craig v.
Boren, which relied on arrest statistics to support a law that restricted the sale of
non-intoxicating beer to young men.164 The Court could have been satisfied with the
fact that young men were nearly ten times more likely than young women to drive
while intoxicated, but the Court was highly skeptical of the assumptions the govern-
ment wanted it to draw from the data.165
Notably, the Court announced that “if maleness is to serve as a proxy for
drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must be considered an unduly tenuous
‘fit.’”166 In fact, the Court went on to state that it had previously struck down con-
siderations of gender that “rested on far more predictive empirical relationships”
than the one presented by the state in Craig.167 In their now seminal study of adult
recidivism predictors, Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little, and Claire Goggin found that
gender had a mean correlation coefficient of 0.10.168 If a 2% correlation could not
161 Tammy Whitlock, Masculinities and Crime in Historical Perspective, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GENDER, SEX, AND CRIME 191, 202 (Rosemary Gartner & Bill McCarthy
eds., 2014).
162 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
163 See Starr, supra note 3, at 825 (noting that the Court has repeatedly invalidated gender
classifications “that are grounded in statistical generalizations about groups—even those with
empirical support”).
164 Craig, 429 U.S. at 200–01. The law at issue in Craig restricted the sale of non-
intoxicating beer to men under the age of twenty-one and women under the age of eighteen.
Id. at 191–92. In order to demonstrate that its law was tailored to promoting highway safety,
the state provided evidence that 2% of eighteen- to twenty-year-old men were arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol as opposed to only 0.18% of young women in the
same demographic. Id. at 201.
165 Id. at 201 (“Even were this statistical evidence accepted as accurate, it nevertheless
offers only a weak answer to the equal protection question presented here.”)
166 See id. at 201–02.
167 Id. at 202 n.13 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
168 Gendreau, Little & Goggin, supra note 126, at 583 tbl.1. As a comparison, criminal
history (0.18), history of antisocial behavior (0.13), antisocial personality (0.18), family
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suffice for fitness in Craig v. Boren, then surely a 0.10 mean predictive average
would not suffice for fitness to save gender-driven evidence-based sentencing regimes.
If maleness could not serve as a proxy for drunk driving, then it should not serve as
a proxy for generalized criminal risk.
In addition to rejecting the weak correlational relationship between gender and
drunk driving, the Court went on to note the various other pitfalls of the statistical
figures that dampened their value to an equal protection analysis.169 The Court’s most
scathing critique of the “methodological problems” behind the surveys notes that the
“social stereotypes” reflected in laws based upon gender differentials “are likely
substantially to distort the accuracy of [their] comparative statistics.”170 The Court
took great issue with the notion that “‘reckless’ young men who drink and drive are
transformed into arrest statistics, whereas their female counterparts are chivalrously
escorted home.”171 Thus, at the very least, the Court seemed quite suspect of the blanket
notion that the affected young men were criminally more reckless than young women,
even though such a notion was nominally grounded in facts.
The methodological issues to which the Court draws attention find support in
the larger literature as well. For example, Greg T. Smith notes that “the availability
of evidence and the incompatibility or inconsistency of sources” provide significant
methodological concerns when attempting to document long-term trends in crimi-
nality.172 Moreover, Smith also identifies additional stumbling blocks when consider-
ing historical changes in “legal definitions, prosecutorial practices, police enforcement,
and victim-reporting practices.”173
Smith notes that legal definitions have varied widely over time and across jurisdic-
tions, undermining efforts to draw broad generalizations from the historical data.174
Additionally, Smith also notes that fluctuations in female convictions were likely a
byproduct of changing prosecutorial practices and discretion, with women often
being tried “in other venues.”175 Godfrey also highlights this concept, noting that
highly localized criminal justice systems were reluctant to impose formal punishments
rearing practices (0.15), criminogenic needs (0.18), and social companions (0.18) were all
more effective than gender at predicting adult recidivism. Id. Only personal distress (0.05),
socioeconomic status (0.06), and intellectual functioning (0.07) provided weaker predictive
values of recidivism. Id.
169 Craig, 429 U.S. at 202–03. Specifically, the Court noted that the state’s studies: (1) failed
to account for the “dangerousness of 3.2% beer as opposed to alcohol generally”; and (2) made
no effort to “relate their findings to age-sex differentials” involved in the case. Id. at 203.
170 Id. at 202 n.14.
171 Id.
172 Greg T. Smith, Long-Term Trends in Female and Male Involvement in Crime, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENDER, SEX, AND CRIME 139, 140 (Rosemary Gartner & Bill
McCarthy eds., 2014).
173 Id. at 144; see also id. at 140–41 (discussing the difficulties in documenting trends in
sex-specific crimes).
174 Id. at 140.
175 Id. at 150.
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on women.176 Godfrey supports the notion that police practices played a large role
in the statistics as well.177 Finally, reporting stigmas also most likely skewed crime
statistics. Smith notes that men faced humiliation if they reported assaults perpe-
trated against them by women.178 Likewise, the legal concept of femme covert meant
that married men would have to answer for the crimes of their wives.179
Another bias reflected in the statistics around the criminal sex divide is that
historians have typically focused on those salacious, sensational, and typically violent
crimes that rise to the occasion of a cause célèbre.180 This is problematic in several
respects. By focusing on violent crimes, for which men are disproportionately re-
sponsible,181 historical statistics ignore the largest category of offenses—minor and
petty crimes.182 As such, historians have undoubtedly glossed over an important indi-
cator of female criminality.183 As for the evidence-based sentencing context, the focus
on the gender gap in violent crime is probably moot.184 Notably, the gender gap be-
tween men and women who commit nonviolent crimes is far less pronounced.185 This
trend is also reflected in recent upticks in the incarceration rates of women relative
to men starting in the 1980s, which was in part due to women’s increased participation
in drug crimes.186
Of course, as scholars are quick to point out, men have always committed more
crimes than women.187 The historical data, however, portrays a much more nuanced
picture when contextualized by the laundry list of methodological issues. Moreover,
176 Godfrey, supra note 110, at 160 (noting that women often received less severe sentences
than men because the costs of child-rearing would otherwise be shifted to taxpayers).
177 Id. at 161 (“The attitudes of male (usually working-class) police officers . . . were key
in defining crimes and in pushing some people towards the courts, while others were ordered
to go home.”).
178 Smith, supra note 172, at 141.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See id. at 142–43 (discussing the historical proportion of homicides committed by men
and women respectively).
182 Id. at 141.
183 See id.
184 Diversion recommendations will generally apply only to those offenders who committed
nonviolent crimes. Moreover, some risk assessment instruments are only considered in non-
violent or petty offenses. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803(6) (West 2011) (stating that
the risk assessment instrument shall not be applied to any violent or serious felony), with 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.7(a) (2010) (permitting the use of risk assessment instruments for de-
fendants “who plead guilty or nolo contendere to or who were found guilty of felonies and mis-
demeanors”), and WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.500 (2014) (permitting risk assessment reports
in cases where the defendant has not been sentenced to life in prison or capital punishment).
185 See Smith, supra note 172, at 147–50 (discussing the historical patterns of nonviolent
crime). In some instances, women offenders actually outnumbered men for certain property
and economic crimes. Id. at 148.
186 See Myers & Wakefield, supra note 104, at 575.
187 See, e.g., Oleson, supra note 34, at 1365–66 nn.301–06.
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such sweeping generalizations lose much of their steam when accounting for the
gender divide in nonviolent crime, which is certainly the focus of evidence-based
sentencing. Statistical assumptions based on the notion that men are more criminal
than women would likely fail to justify considerations of gender in risk assessment,
even though they may be supported by “facts.” The government’s tailoring argu-
ment does not hinge solely upon failed comparisons to affirmative action or faulty
statistics. The notion that criminality is a decidedly male characteristic manifests in
other iterations of the same argument.
C. The Physicality of Gendered Criminality
The Court has been somewhat permissive in allowing gender discrimination
when the classification has been based upon physical differences between the sexes.
As the Court warned in United States v. Virginia, although “[p]hysical differences
between men and women . . . are enduring,” such differences could not be used “for
denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s
opportunity.”188 The Court has repeatedly held, however, that the physical differ-
ences in the sexes’ contributions and commitments to childbirth can be substantially
related to sufficient governmental objectives.189 In Michael M. v. Superior Court, the
Court upheld a statutory rape law that applied only to men.190 Likewise, in Nguyen
v. I.N.S., the Court upheld a statute that made it more difficult for the progeny of
citizen fathers (rather than citizen mothers) who were born out of wedlock abroad
to obtain citizenship.191
In Nguyen, the Court went on to state that “[m]echanistic classification of all our
differences as stereotypes would operate to obscure those misconceptions and
prejudices that are real.”192 Classifying criminality, or lack thereof, as an irreducible
physical feature does just that—it obscures the very real and present prejudice that
men are riskier than women and therefore deserve to be punished more severely.
Such platitudes not only reflect stereotypes rooted in faulty statistics, they also
confuse the central issue by conflating concrete physical characteristics with abstract
188 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). Specifically, the Court noted that gender classifications
could be used to remedy past discrimination against women, but they could not be used “to
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.” Id. at 533–34.
189 See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
Cty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
190 450 U.S. at 471 (“We need not be medical doctors to discern that young men and
young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual
intercourse. Only women may become pregnant, and they suffer disproportionately the
profound physical, emotional, and psychological consequences of sexual activity.”).
191 533 U.S. at 64 (“Given that the mother is always present at birth, but that the father
need not be, the facially neutral rule would sometimes require fathers to take additional
affirmative steps which would not be required of mothers.”).
192 Id. at 73.
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personality traits. These notions undeniably mistake sex, a biological trait, for gender,
a social construct.
Pregnancy and its disparate burdens are phenomena undeniably rooted in biology.
Criminality and its risks of recidivism patently are not.193 As Professor Starr notes,
“[A] generalization about a behavioral tendency like criminal recidivism is simply not
comparable to a physical difference.”194 In fact, gender is best defined as “socially
produced in the ongoing interactions of everyday life.”195 Thus, increased criminality
in the male gender can be better understood as the byproduct of social (rather than
physical) forces.
Criminologists certainly have helped to reinforce, if not perpetuate, this observa-
tion. For example, Jody Miller notes that “[m]any criminologists remain primarily
concerned with explaining men’s offending.”196 This intense focus has led to the
notion that male offending is the “norm,” rather than treating gender as “a feature
of social organization that requires careful interrogation.”197 As such, crime has largely
been defined in terms of “masculinity.”198 More important, ephemeral notions of
“masculinity,” or what it means to be a man, are even further removed from physi-
cality than notions of gender, although the two concepts are somewhat circular.
In order to better understand how expectations of masculinity can lead to in-
creased rates of crime among men, James W. Messerschmidt’s theory of “hegemonic
masculinity” provides a rather insightful lens.199 Messerschmidt defines “hegemonic
masculinity” as “the idealized form of masculinity in a given historical setting.”200
Further, the theory of “hegemonic masculinity emphasizes practices toward authority,
control, competitive individualism, independence, aggressiveness, and the capacity
for violence.”201
193 As of yet, the research has not been able to identify a definitive biological basis for
increased criminal behavior in males. See Jill Portnoy et al., Biological Perspectives on Sex
Differences in Crime and Antisocial Behavior, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENDER, SEX,
AND CRIME 260, 261–76 (Rosemary Gartner & Bill McCarthy eds., 2014) (examining genetics,
brain structures, neuropsychology, and psychophysiology to find relationship between sex
and crime and finding inconclusive results).
194 Starr, supra note 3, at 829.
195 Jody Miller, Doing Crime as Doing Gender? Masculinities, Femininities, and Crime,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENDER, SEX, AND CRIME 19, 19 (Rosemary Gartner & Bill
McCarthy eds., 2014).
196 Id. at 22. Miller also notes that such studies often fail to account for exactly how
“gender is implicated in male offending.” Id.
197 Id. at 23 (citation omitted).
198 See Whitlock, supra note 161, at 197 (“Because crime, especially violent crime, was
seen as a man’s game, women involved in particularly violent crimes . . . might be labeled
as ‘masculine.’”).
199 See JAMES W. MESSERSCHMIDT, MASCULINITIES AND CRIME: CRITIQUE AND RECON-
CEPTUALIZATION OF THEORY 81–83 (1993); see also R.W. Connell & James W. Messerschmidt,
Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 829 (2005).
200 MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 199, at 82.
201 Id. (citation omitted).
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In context, the concept of hegemonic masculinity illuminates why men commit
crimes in light of the particular social pressures of a given time. For example, this
concept can help explain the downward trend in violent crimes committed by men.202
Whitlock notes that several studies identify a decline in “positively viewed mascu-
line violence,” starting with the upper classes as early as the eighteenth century and
eventually trickling down the lower strata of the social spheres.203 This decline can
no doubt be attributed to the idealized hegemonic masculinity of the civilized “home
Englishman” in the Victorian era.204
Likewise, Connell and Messerschmidt note that “research in criminology showed
how particular patterns of aggression were linked with hegemonic masculinity, not
as a mechanical effect for which hegemonic masculinity was a cause, but through
the pursuit of hegemony.”205 This pursuit of dominance can explain a great deal of
crime in the modern context. Miller argues that crime can be seen as a “masculine-
validating resource,” which can serve as means to retake power in certain emasculat-
ing situations.206 Miller points out that this behavior is particularly salient for African
American men, who are reacting to a “unique history of racial oppression and persistent
denial of access to legitimate avenues of mainstream masculinity construction.”207
The implications of gender classifications are far more complex than binary risk
assessment scales or cutoff points suggest. Treating criminality like a physical char-
acteristic ignores the nuanced, subtle, and, at times, competing expectations society
has crafted for the genders. Unlike pregnancy, criminality has no foundation in an
individual’s biological makeup. Rather, gender is the result of external social forces
that have unfortunately reinforced the notion that crime is a largely “male” pursuit.
Furthermore, crime often provides the only viable channel in which to seek the power
or authority that has been denied to certain subgroups. At any rate, such consider-
ations often pose difficult questions that simply cannot be answered by comparisons
to physical differences between the sexes.
In summary, affirmative action analogies, statistical and historical predictions,
and physical characteristics do not provide “exceedingly persuasive” justifications
for the use of gender in evidence-based sentencing systems. Moreover, given the
logical flaws, methodological shortcomings, and shallow assumptions that plague
such arguments, they could hardly be considered “substantially related” to the goals
of preventing crime or reducing incarceration. As such, in addition to failing to
202 See Smith, supra note 172, at 142–43 (discussing a decrease in men’s lethal violence
between twelfth-century England and seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England); Whitlock,
supra note 161, at 194–97 (highlighting a decline of positively viewed masculine violence
in the eighteenth century).
203 Whitlock, supra note 161, at 194–95.
204 See Smith, supra note 172, at 146–47.
205 Connell & Messerschmidt, supra note 199, at 834 (citation omitted).
206 Miller, supra note 195, at 24.
207 Id. at 25 (quoting CHRISTOPHER W. MULLINS, HOLDING YOUR SQUARE: MASCULINITIES,
STREETLIFE, AND VIOLENCE 25 (2006)).
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further the governmental objectives, inclusion of gender in risk assessment also misses
the mark as a matter of tailoring.
CONCLUSION
The utilization of evidence-based sentencing, to be sure, enjoys and will likely
continue to enjoy its widespread, almost unanimous support.208 In the abstract, the
proffered objectives behind evidence-based sentencing are both lofty and legitimate.
Whom among us would not support a sentencing regime that actually prevented
crime209 and reduced incarceration?210 The issue arises, however, when such desirable
objectives are premised upon undesirable means.211 Yes, arguably everyone may want
fewer crimes and incarcerations, but should the equal treatment of men be sacrificed
in order to achieve that end? Therein lies the rub: How do evidence-based sentencing
regimes balance constitutionality with predictive accuracy?212 The answer is simple.
The LSI-R213 strikes an equilibrium between statistically accurate recidivism
prediction without relying on gender to root it in constitutionally suspect footing.
In fact, the LSI-R uses risk factors from non-suspect criminogenic domains to shape
sentencing decisions.214 As a matter of equal treatment, the LSI-R’s desirability is
in part derived from the fact that it draws upon dynamic, rather than static, factors.215
In fact, at the time of their meta-analysis, Gendreau, Little, and Goggin recommended
the LSI-R as a useful actuarial measure of adult recidivism.216 The LSI-R thus serves
the government’s desire to identify risk and divert appropriate offenders out of the
208 See supra Part II.
209 See supra Part III.A.
210 See supra Part III.B.
211 See supra Part IV.
212 Christopher Slobogin highlights the dilemma as follows:
[R]isk assessment is only likely to be sufficiently and knowably accurate
if it is based on actuarial instruments, but it is only likely to avoid constitu-
tional, justice, and fairness objections if it relies on demonstrably less
accurate unstructured clinical judgement that eschews use of demographic
information and other immutable traits.
Slobogin, supra note 2, at 209.
213 Don Andrews and James Bonta developed the LSI-R in 1995. See CASEY, WARREN &
ELEK, supra note 34, at 5 app.A.
214 Such criminogenic factors include criminal history, education and employment, personal
finances, personal relationships, accommodations, leisure and recreation, substance use,
mental health, and attitudes. See id.; Anthony W. Flores et al., Validating the Level of Service
Inventory—Revised on a Sample of Federal Probationers, 70 FED. PROBATION 44, 45 (2006).
215 Paula Smith et al., Can 14,737 Women Be Wrong? A Meta-Analysis of the LSI-R and
Recidivism for Female Offenders, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 183, 197 (2009) (“This
approach not only increases the predictive power of the LSI-R but also directs attention to
sources of offender recidivism that can be changed and thus are amenable to treatment.”).
216 Gendreau, Little & Goggin, supra note 126, at 575, 591.
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prison system without doubly punishing male offenders for both their crimes and the
crimes of their gender.
For twenty years, the LSI-R has predicted adult recidivism risk without relying
on constitutionally suspect variables. In spite of the LSI-R’s proven utility, however,
some argue that gender neutrality poses greater harms for women217 and that the
LSI-R has varying levels of success between the genders.218 When subjected to statis-
tical analysis, however, such arguments do not hold true. In fact, the LSI-R predicts
recidivism risk almost identically for both men and women.219 At least one state has
independently reached this conclusion.220 The North Carolina Sentencing and Policy
Advisory Commission expressed concerns about the constitutionality of gender con-
siderations in its offender risk assessment.221 Additional statistical analysis omitting
gender overwhelmingly “confirmed the predictive validity of the revised risk score.”222
As such, the use of gender in criminal risk assessment is not only constitutionally
unsound, it is statistically superfluous.
To be sure, evidence-based practice is not the enemy. Efforts to make the crim-
inal justice system more reliable, more predictable, and more efficient should be
applauded. The law, however, cannot and must not embrace such systems if the cost
is equal protection under the law. Simply put, the use of gender in evidence-based
sentencing is repugnant to the Constitution. Based on the proffered governmental
objectives, evidence-based sentencing has a great deal of ground to cover before it
meets its stated goals. Based on the empirical tailoring, the use of gender has arguably
hindered, rather than helped, these goals.
Through continued scientific and constitutional scrutiny, evidence-based sen-
tencing regimes will undoubtedly play a large role in remedying America’s mass-
incarceration problem. By excising gender in risk assessment instruments, the states
that rely on evidence-based sentencing will be able to root such practices in sound
constitutional principles without abandoning actuarial accuracy. Only then will the
two hypothetical offenders receive the same, exact sentence for the same, exact
crime. Only then will both women and men receive the appropriate intervention and
diversion. It just might save this nation. It just might save some young man’s life.
217 See Raeder, supra note 103, at 2 (arguing that gender neutrality in criminal sentencing
imposes “draconian costs” on female offenders).
218 Kristy Holtfreter & Rhonda Cupp, Gender and Risk Assessment: The Empirical Status
of the LSI-R for Women, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 363, 364 (2007) (claiming that the LSI-
R does not apply to all offenders equally); Michael D. Reisig et al., Assessing Recidivism
Risk Across Female Pathways to Crime, 23 JUST. Q. 384, 400 (2006) (arguing that the LSI-R
misclassifies marginalized women).
219 See Smith et al., supra note 215, at 193 tbl.1 (summarizing studies of LSI-R’s risk
prediction rate between genders).
220 See N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 39, at 13.
221 See id.
222 Id.
